EXECUTIVE- LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL AUTONOMY IN THE EFFICACY OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN NIGERIA

Abstract

The effectiveness of the House of Representatives' legislative oversight in Nigeria was evaluated, along with the relationship between the Executive and the Legislature and the significance of financial autonomy. The research examined a number of conceptual and empirical works that demonstrated agreement on certain points of view while presenting divergent opinions on others. The study's findings were explained using a combination of David Easton's input-output analysis and Gabriel Almond's 1966 structural-functionalism. The relationship between the phenomena under examination was explained by the study through the use of a descriptive survey approach. Out of the 2,730 people in the study population, a sample of 546 was taken. Based on the researcher's assessment, the respondents who took part in the survey were chosen by the purposeful sampling approach. The questionnaire was the instrument used in the study to collect data. The Likert scale with four points was used for this. The descriptive data was analyzed using mean and standard deviation, and the study's hypotheses were tested using Pearson Product Moment Correlation. The effectiveness of the House of Representatives' legislative monitoring in Nigeria is influenced by the financial autonomy of the House, according to the study. To enhance the effectiveness of legislative monitoring of the Nigerian House of Representatives, the report proposed that the House of Representatives operate with financial autonomy. Financial independence and the ability to perform their oversight responsibilities as needed of them will be ensured by their financial autonomy.