CORRUPTION AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN NIGERIA’S FOURTH REPUBLIC

Abstract

The study looked at the efficacy of the House of Representatives' legislative oversight duties in Nigeria as well as corruption. The purpose of the study was to test a hypothesis on the impact of corruption on House of Representatives legislative oversight. The input-output analysis of David Easton and Gabriel Almond's (1966) structural functionalism were used to interpret the data collected for this investigation. The relationship between the phenomena under examination was explained by the study through the use of a descriptive survey approach. Out of the 2,730 people in the study population, a sample of 546 was taken. Based on the researcher's assessment, the respondents who took part in the survey were chosen by the purposeful sampling approach. The questionnaire was the instrument used in the study to collect data. The Likert scale with four points was used for this. The descriptive data was analyzed using mean and standard deviation, and the study's hypotheses were tested using Pearson Product Moment Correlation. According to the study, Nigeria's House of Representatives' legislative supervision is less effective when there is a culture of corruption. The study suggests that in order to reduce the culture of corruption, excesses associated with House of Representatives operations should be eliminated. Individual and institutional attitudes should also be reoriented. They should also be exposed to training on the appropriate approaches to the discharge of their legislative oversight responsibilities and submit to mentoring by more experienced legislators.